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Abstract  
Safety systems are designed to prevent or mitigate the consequences of potentially 
hazardous events. In many industries the failure of such systems can result in fatalities. 
Current design practice is usually to produce a safety system which meets a target level of 
performance that is deemed acceptable by the regulators. However, when the system 
failure will result in fatalities it is desirable for the system to achieve an optimal rather 
than adequate level of performance given the limitations placed on available resources.  
The unavailability of safety systems can be predicted using fault tree analysis methods. 
Formulating an optimisation problem for the system design has features which make 
standard mathematical optimisation techniques inappropriate. The form of the objective 
function is itself a function of the design variables, the design variables are mainly 
integers and the constraint forms can be implicit or non-linear.  
This paper presents a Branching Search algorithm which exploits characteristics common 
to many safety systems to explore the potential design space and deliver an optimal 
design. Efficiency in the method is maintained by performing the system unavailability 
evaluations using the Binary Decision Diagram method of fault tree solution. Limitations 
are placed on resources such as cost, maintenance down-time and spurious trip frequency. 
Its application is demonstrated on a High Integrity Protection System.  
Keywords: Optimisation, Safety Systems, Fault Tree Analysis  
1. Introduction  
The traditional design process consists of the iterative stages of preliminary design, 
analysis, appraisal and redesign. For safety systems the design is usually required to 
deliver a specified availability performance to keep the risk within tolerable limits. If, 
following analysis, the initial design does not meet the pre-determined acceptability 
criteria for system unavailability, it is redesigned and the analysis and appraisal repeated. 
Since safety system failure can, in many industries, result in fatalities a better approach 
would be to maximise the availability of the system and in turn minimise the potential 
fatalities. This would require an optimisation process to be used to determine the design 
parameters. The system performance is optimised subject to constraints placed on the 
resources available (such as initial cost, life-cycle cost, weight, volume, spurious trip 
frequency or maintenance effort). The variables concerned with the design and operation 
of safety systems will be features such as redundancy levels, diversity levels, component 
selection, voting systems for sensors and maintenance test intervals. The system 
assessment can be carried out using the fault tree analysis method embedded within the 
optimisation methodology.  
The safety system design optimisation problem has features that mean generalised 
mathematical optimisation procedures are either inappropriate or ineffective. In the main 
difficulties arise due to the lack of an accurate explicit objective function over the entire, 
or even relatively small part, of the search space. This is caused because each time a 
design parameter is altered a new objective function is formed. Further complications 
occur as a result of the integer stipulation assigned to all of the design variables, where the 
integer values are usually low and their range restricted. The constraints limiting the 
available resources can also be highly non-linear in form and in some instances, for 
example the spurious trip frequency, are implicit and require a full system evaluation to 
assess. In addition, certain design parameters are dependent on the values assigned to 
other parameters and an optimisation method which manipulates these variables 
independently, may result in an infeasible optimal design.  
An approach by which optimal performance can be obtained using the Fault Tree Analysis 
method to determine the availability of each system was first introduced in 1994 [1]. A 
single fault tree was developed to represent the causes of system failure for all possible 
design variations. This was achieved using House Events to turn on and off appropriate 
branches. This approach has since been modified and improved by using the Binary 
Decision Diagram method [2-6], to analyse the fault trees. This makes the analysis 
procedure more efficient and more accurate. The optimisation procedures which can be 
used to perform the optimisation include Genetic Algorithms [7-8], the Grid-Sampling 
technique [9] and a design of experiments based method [10]. An efficient optimisation 
procedure would need to be problem specific and developed to solve each particular 
design problem. Some integer programming problems can be solved by Branch and 
Bound algorithms and it is such an approach that is presented in this paper.  
The remainder of this paper discusses reasons for using Branching Search (section 2), the 
application to a safety system design problem (section 3), safety system design 
performance (section 4), the Branching Search Algorithm (section 5), and the results of 
applying this new technique to the safety system are discussed in the final sections.  
2. Design Optimisation Procedure  
Certain optimisation techniques address one or more of the difficult features of the safety 
system design problem such as: integer variables, no explicit objective function, implicit 
constraints and the interaction of parameters. A specialised method, or methods, could, 
thus, be created to solve the safety system design optimisation problem using an 
amalgamation of features from the applicable techniques. Aspects typical of safety system 
design such as redundant/diverse structures give some independent partitioning of the 
design space which can be used to focus the method developed to the specific problem. 
The key features of different optimisation techniques that lend themselves to the safety 
system optimisation are discussed below.  
When little is known about the function in question the aim is to devise an optimisation 
algorithm that will distinguish between the local minima and locate the best local 
minimum, i.e. solve the global optimisation problem. In the majority of cases this is 
successfully achieved using probabilistic methods. The simplest of these is the random 
search. The use of random sampling of decision variables within their specified range is 
applied in much of the random search literature. This feature is a simple yet effective 
means of establishing a feasible solution vector, being easy to implement within a general 
optimisation algorithm. In addition random sampling encourages global consideration of 
the search space thus combating premature convergence of a localised approach.  
Optimising integer values within a restricted range has been achieved by using a 
‘Combinatorial heuristic’ [11]. The method relies on fixing design variables using a look-
ahead search, which is a means to incorporate interaction with the next variable. The 
method uses little or no assumption concerning the structure of the objective function and 
constraint functions and constraint evaluations can easily be incorporated at each step 
with infeasible designs rejected. Of most importance is that the approach is able to 
consider an element of dependency between the system variables.  
Misra and Sharma in 1991 [12] proposed a simple and effective technique for solving 
integer programming problems. It involved a systematic search near the boundary of the 
constraints. ‘Tolerable slacks’ were introduced to define the appropriate regions to search 
given the constraints. For techniques which are very computationally intensive these 
tolerable slacks limit the number of function evaluations required as the optimal design 
will usually fully utilise all available resources and the interior of the design space can be 
ignored. This will also enable designs for which there is a significant improvement in 
performance for a minor violation of a constraint to remain in contention for the chosen 
design.  
For the system design optimisation problem, the use of random sampling should help to 
find the global solution to the problem. Incorporating the combinatorial heuristic look-
ahead search type approach allows for integer values and variable dependency, and if 
tolerable slacks are included, this restricts the number of function evaluations required. 
The combination of these three elements should provide a useful tool for this specific 
optimisation problem, and will be referred to as the Branching Search approach.  
3. Branching Search Approach and Application Safety System  
The Branching Search approach uses random sampling and a look-ahead search combined 
with the use of tolerable slacks about the constraints to improve the efficiency of the 
search. This approach is to be tested on a real industrial problem involving a High 
Integrity Protection System (HIPS). The function of the HIPS is to prevent a high-
pressure surge passing through the system. The structure of the system is shown in figure 
1. The high pressure originates from a production well of a not normally manned offshore 
platform (left of the diagram) and the pieces of equipment to be protected are vessels 
located downstream on the processing platform (right of the diagram).  
Sub-system 1 Sub-system 2  
 
Figure 1 -High Integrity Protection System  
The system has two levels of protection which function independently. The first is the emergency shutdown 
(ESD) subsystem and the second is a high-integrity protection system (HIPS). Both work in a similar manner. 
Pressure in the pipeline is monitored using pressure transmitters (PT’s). When the pipeline pressure exceeds the 
permitted value then the ESD system acts to close the Wing and Master valves on the well together with any ESD 
valves that have been fitted. If the pressure transmitters in the HIPS system detect an excess in pressure this 
system acts to close the HIPS valves.  
Within this system the problem is to determine the necessary configuration of the high integrity protection. As 
with many practical applications there is a conflict between operational and safety requirements. The aim of this 
method is therefore to optimise the system design parameters to minimise system unavailability, given limited 
resources.  
To minimise the system unavailability a number of design options have been considered. These are:  
i)  How many ESD valves are required (0,1,2)?  E  
ii)  How many HIPS valves are required (0,1,2)?  H  
iii)  How many pressure transmitters for each subsystem (0,1,2,3,4)?  N1, N2  
iv)  How many transmitters are required to trip?  K1, K2  
v)  Which of two possible types of ESD/HIPS valves to select?  V  
vi)  Which of two possible types of pressure transmitters to select?  P  
vii)  Maintenance test interval in weeks for each subsystem (4-104 weeks)?  θ1, θ2  
 
Although a relatively small system, even with just these ten design parameters, it is not possible to manually trade 
off the effects of different design alternatives, hence the need for a technique which will provide the optimal 
solution.  
The data relating to the system components are provided in table 1. This data specifies the failure rate (dormant 
and spurious failure modes), average repair time, cost, and test time.  
A look-ahead search is carried out about each of the variables N1, N2, K1, K2, E and H. Interaction with the types 
of variables, V and P, and each maintenance test interval parameter θ1 and θ2, is considered within each look-
ahead search.  
In addition to the design variables, there are three constraints that have been placed on the design. These are 
limitations on: i) the total system cost, ii) the average time each year that the system resides in the down state due 
to preventive maintenance, and iii) the number of times that a spurious system shutdown occurs.  
Component  Dormant 
Failure Rate  
Dormant Mean 
Repair Time  
Spurious 
Failure 
Rate  
Spurious Mean 
Repair Time  
Cost  Test 
time  
Wing Valve  1.14 x 10-5  36.0  1 x 10-6  36.0  100  12  
Master Valve  1.14 x 10-5  36.0  1 x 10-6  36.0  100  12  
HIPS1  5.44 x 10-6  36.0  5 x 10-7  36.0  250  15  
HIPS2  1 x 10-5  36.0  1 x 10-5  36.0  200  10  
ESDV1  5.44 x 10-6  36.0  5 x 10-7  36.0  250  15  
ESDV2  1 x 10-5  36.0  1 x 10-5  36.0  200  10  
Solenoid Valve  5 x 10-6  36.0  5 x 10-7  36.0  20  5  
Relay Contacts  0.23 x 10-6  36.0  2 x 10-6  36.0  1  2  
PT1  1.5 x 10-6  36.0  1.5 x 10-5  36.0  20  1  
PT2  7 x 10-6  36.0  7 x 10-5  36.0  10  2  
Computer Logic  1 x 10-5  36.0  1 x 10-5  36.0  20  1  
 
Table 1 -Component Data  
Tolerable slacks must be established about each of the constraints. It is decided to set 
these bounds as follows:  
800 units ≤ cost ≤ 1000 units  
110 hours ≤ MDT ≤ 130 hours  
0.6 per year ≤ spurious trip frequency ≤ 1 per year Designs are assumed infeasible 
when constraint values fall either side of the tolerable slacks.  
4. Safety System Design Performance  
The most important feature of a safety system is that it functions on demand. The 
objective is, therefore, to minimise system unavailability and as such this provides a 
measure of system performance. There is no explicit objective function that can be 
formulated to evaluate system unavailability. The fault tree method is utilised for this. 
House events [1] are used within the fault tree to allow for all potential designs to be 
incorporated within one tree. House events in the fault tree, which are either TRUE or 
FALSE, are utilised to switch on or off different branches to model the changes in the 
causes of failure for each design alternative. An example fault tree section for the causes 
of valve failure where the valve installed in the design can be one of two alternative types 
is shown in figure 2.  
 Figure 2 -Fault Tree with House Events to represent the design variables  
Analysis of the fault tree structure is evaluated using the Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) 
Approach, which can introduce significant advantages into the quantitative process and 
allows the probability of the system failure mode to be calculated exactly rather than 
using approximate methods. Details of the fault tree to BDD conversion process and the 
analysis of the resulting logic diagram are given in reference [8].  
5. Branching Search Algorithm  
For any design problem a deep understanding of the system and its requirements is 
required prior to any detailed modelling. Thus, any optimisation technique implemented 
needs to be structured according to the problem. The Branching Search Algorithm is 
specific to the features of the HIPS safety system and is implemented in the following 
steps:  
1) An initial design is randomly generated, and its unavailability is calculated using the 
BDD methodology. Each of the constraints are checked and where a violation occurs 
and the design is infeasible a new design is generated. This process is repeated until a 
feasible design is achieved.  
2)A variable ordering is generated, i.e. the order in which the variables are considered in 
the look-ahead search. Initially the ordering is chosen to be {N1, K1, E, H, N2, K2, E, 
K1, N1, H, K2, N2}. The choice of ordering is somewhat arbitrary and as such offers a 
significant degree of leeway. Variables adjacent to one another are those that are most 
likely to interact, therefore aiding the look-ahead search. In the main an optimal 
design is established following a single iteration of each variable. An additional 
iteration of each variable is however, implemented and the variable order shuffled, as 
shown by the variables in italics in the initial ordering. This serves the purpose of 
considering further likely interactions. The variable ordering does make use of the 
independent redundant structures of the ESD and HIPS systems and places variables 
of each of the subsystems adjacent in the ordering.  
3) For each variable in turn, as specified by the variable ordering, 
the look-ahead search progresses as given below: i) For the 
variable selected, a feasible range is established in view of the 
fixed values assigned to the other variables in the current 
design vector. ii) A look-ahead search is then conducted 
involving the next variable in the ordering list and either V or 
P. If the next variable in the list concerns the pressure 
transmitters (N1, N2, K1, K2) then P is chosen else (E, H) V 
is the variable to be considered. iii) All the possible 
combinations of the feasible values of the three variables are 
established. The remaining design parameters are held fixed 
with values as in the starting design. The associated system 
unavailability is generated as follows: a) Evaluate system cost, 
C. Check that the resulting value lies within the tolerable 
slacks for cost. If C < 800 or C > 1000 units assign a value of 
1 to the system unavailability of the design in question and 
repeat part (a) with the next combination. If all combinations 
have been considered go to step (iv). b) Evaluate the spurious 
trip frequency, F. Ensure that the resulting value lies within 
the tolerable slacks for the trip rate. If F < 0.6 or F > 1 assign a 
value of 1 to the  
system unavailability of the design in question and repeat part (a) with 
the next combination. If all combinations have been considered go to 
step (iv).  
c) For each combination of maintenance test intervals calculate the 
design’s MDT. The maintenance test interval ranges from 4 – 104 
weeks, in intervals of 4 weeks. This is used to limit the number of 
function evaluations needed. If the MDT falls within the respective 
tolerable slacks evaluate the system unavailability associated with the 
design. Retain the maintenance test interval combination that results in 
the most optimal system unavailability for the design in question. If 
MDT < 110 or MDT > 130 hours assign a value of 1 to the system 
unavailability of the design in question and repeat part (a) with the next 
combination. If all combinations have been considered go to step (iv).  
iv)The system unavailability associated with each possible design is compared and the 
best is selected. If the current variable selected is the penultimate in the list, the 
algorithm continues at step (4). Else, the chosen variable is fixed, along with 
the type variable, and step (3) is repeated for the next variable in the ordering 
list.  
4) The resulting best design, considers maintenance test interval values for subsystems 1 
and 2 in 4 weekly intervals. Optimise the use of the available MDT resource for this 
resulting best design over the full range of test interval values.  
5) Ensure termination criteria met. Else repeat step (3) with first variable in ordering list.  
The order in which the variables are considered will affect the steps of the algorithm and 
may result in convergence to a different optimal design vector. The order of variables is 
considered in more detail in section 7.  
There are various means to terminate the algorithm. Rather than specifying a fixed 
number of iterations the program could be altered to terminate when, for example, the 
optimal design has consistently attained a specified termination criteria over k iterations, 
where the ordering is repeated up to this point. The value of k is set to 3 for use in this 
research.  
6. Application of Branching Search Algorithm to System Analysis  
The Branching Search Algorithm was applied to the HIPS system. A detailed run through 
of the steps taken is given below with the output specified at each step.  
Step 1) An initial design (x0) is randomly generated.  
 E  K1/N1  H  K2/N2 P  V  θ1  θ2  QSYS  Q′ SYS  
x(0)  1  2/3  1  2/2  1  1  23  36  0.00137  0.0061 
 
Step 2) Variable ordering, {N1, K1, E, H, N2, K2, E, K1, N1, H, K2, N2} established. 
Step 3) First variable in list considered, N1.  
i)  Feasible values for N1, given values of other parameters are {2, 3, 4}. N1 cannot equal 1  
 as the number of transmitters set to trip (K1) is 2.  
ii)  K1 is the next variable in the ordering list and as it relates to the pressure transmitters P is  
 the type variable chosen.  
iii)  All possible combinations of N1, K1 and P are generated with E = 1, H = 1, K2/N2 = 2/2,  
 V = 1 fixed as in the initial design. Each combination and its related fitness are shown in  
 table 2.  Note that in all but rows 5 and 11 the spurious trip frequency lies outside its  
 respective tolerable slacks and hence, values are not assigned to the maintenance test  
 interval parameters.  
iv)  The best design arises in the fifth  row of table 2.  This design is  now  used for 
 consideration of the next variable in the ordering list, with N1 = 3 and P = 1.  
 
Step (3) is repeated with the next variable in the ordering list.  
x(0) N1,K1,P  K1/N1  P  1  2  Cost  FSYS  MDT  QSYS  
1  1 / 2  1  - - 902  0.551  - 1  
2  1 / 2  2  - - 862  1.51  - 1  
3  2/2  1  - - 902  0.289  - 1  
4  2/2  2  - - 862  0.295  - 1  
5  1/3  1  48  20  922  0.681  130  0.0016  
6  1/3  2  - - 872  2.11  - 1  
7  2/3  1  - - 922  0.289  - 1  
8  2/3  2  - - 872  0.301  - 1  
9  3/3  1  - - 922  0.290  - 1  
10  3/3  2  - - 872  0.292  - 1  
11  1 / 4  1  52  20  942  0.812  126  0.0017  
12  1 / 4  2  - - 882  2.71  - 1  
13  2/4  1  - - 942  0.551  - 1  
14  2/4  2  - - 882  1.51  - 1  
15  3 / 4  1  - - 942  0.289  - 1  
16  3 / 4  2  - - 882  0.292  - 1  
17  4/4  1  - - 942  0.289  - 1  
18  4/4  2  - - 882  0.292  - 1  
 
Table 2: Fitness evaluations for designs considering N1.  
Step (3) Consider K1:  
 E  K1/N1  H  K2/N2  P  V  
x(1)  1  1/3  1  2/2  1  1  
 
i) Feasible values of K1 are {1,2,3}. As N1 is set to 3, K1 can not equal 4.  
ii)E is the next variable, which relates to the valves hence V is the type of variable to be 
considered.  
iii)All possible combinations involving the three parameters are shown in table 3, where 
N1 = 3, H = 1, K2/N2 = 2/2 and P=1 remain fixed. Fitness evaluations are also 
stated, concluding that only the designs in rows 3 and 4 lie in the tolerable slacks 
for cost and spurious trip frequency.  
iv)The best design arises in row 4 of table 3, with unavailability of 0.0014. For the next 
iteration K1 is set to 1 and V to 2. The total design specification is given below.  
 E  K1/N1  H  K2/N2  P  V  
x(2)  1  1/3  1  2/2  1  2  
 
x(1) K1,E,V  K1  E  V  1  2  Cost  FSYS  MDT  QSYS  
1  1  0  1  - - 652  - - 1  
2  1  0  2  - - 602  - - 1  
3  1  1  1  48  20  922  0.681  130  0.0016  
4  1  1  2  48  16  822  0.847  130  0.0014  
5  1  2  1  - - 1192  - - 1  
6  1  2  2  - - 1042  - - 1  
7  2  0  1  - - 652  - - 1  
8  2  0  2  - - 602  - - 1  
9  2  1  1  - - 922  0.289  - 1  
10  2  1  2  - - 822  0.455  - 1  
11  2  2  1  - - 1192  - - 1  
12  2  2  2  - - 1042  - - 1  
13  3  0  1  - - 652  - - 1  
14  3  0  2  - - 602  - - 1  
15  3  1  1  - - 922  0.289  - 1  
16  3  1  2  - - 822  0.455  - 1  
17  3  2  1  - - 1192  - - 1  
18  3  2  2  - - 1042  - - 1  
 
Table 3: Fitness evaluations for designs considering K1.  
Consideration is given to each variable in turn. In total step (3) is carried out eleven times. 
The modifications to the initial design following each iteration are specified in table 4. 
Note that QSYS is the system unavailability of the best design vector, xb, resulting from an iteration of step 3.  
 Table 4: Design alterations through execution of step 3.  
Step 4: Evaluating the system designs for all possible maintenance test intervals gives the resulting optimal 
design:  
E K1/N1  
H  
K2/N2  
P  
V  
COST  
MDT  
θ1  
θ2  
FSYS  
QSYS  
X
(11)  
0 1/3  
2  
2/3  
1  
2  
40  
24  
842  
0.847  
130  
7.92x10
-4 
 
Step 5: It can be seen from table 3 that iterations 5 to 11 portray consistent predictions of the optimal design.  
Corresponding Author: L.M.Bartlett Email: L.M.Bartlett@lboro.ac.uk Fax: 01509 227275 The approach was 
further tested on four different initial designs. In each case the initial design and final optimal design are stated in 
table 5. Table 6 specifies the fitness components associated with the optimal design resulting from each start 
point.  
Run No.  E  K1/N1  H  K2/N2  P  V  θ1  θ2  QSYS  Q′ SYS  
1  x(0)  1  2/3  1  2/2  1  1  23  36  0.00137  0.0061  
 x(11)  0  1/3  2  2/3  1  2  40  24  7.92x10-4  7.92x10-4  
2  x(0)  1  4/4  1  3/3  1  1  70  50  0.0094  0.0094  
 x(11)  0  1/4  2  2/4  1  2  28  36  8.26x10-4  8.26x10-4  
3  x(0)  2  1/1  2  4/4  1  2  40  65  0.0036  0.0067  
 x(11)  0  1/1  2  1/2  1  1  28  40  0.001  0.001  
4  x(0)  1  1/3  1  2/3  2  2  89  28  0.004  0.014  
 x(11)  0  1/4  2  2/4  1  2  28  36  8.26x10-4  8.26x10-4  
5  x(0)  2  1/1  1  1/1  2  2  70  50  0.013  0.11  
 x(11)  0  1/1  2  1/3  1  2  32  28  8.31x10-4  8.31x10-4  
 
Table 5: Results from additional runs using Logical Search Algorithm  
Run No.  Cost  MDT  FSYS  QSYS = Q′ SYS  
1  x(11)  842  130  0.847  7.92x10-4  
2  x(11)  882  129.6  0.978  8.26x10-4  
3  x(11)  882  129.1  0.681  0.001  
4  x(11)  882  129.6  0.978  8.26x10-4  
5  x(11)  802  128.6  0.977  8.31x10-4  
 
Table 6: Fitness of optimal designs given in table 4.  
The best design is achieved in run number 1 and has a system unavailability of 7.92 x 10
-4 
. The optimal design 
achieved in each run is highly fit, yet there is significant variety in the parameter set of each optimal design 
vector. The resulting design is highly dependent on the choice of the initial design point.  
7. Ordering of Variables  
7.1 Alternative Method 1  
The order in which variables are considered in the look-ahead search determines the type of interactions in the 
parameter set that are analysed. The particular ordering used so far is chosen primarily to focus on interactions 
between variables in subsystem 1 and interactions between the variables in subsystem 2. The interaction between 
the number of ESD valves and the number of HIPS valves is also investigated.  
The ordering used thus far considers little interaction between the pressure transmitters of each system. An 
alternative ordering is considered which addresses this. Using the same initial designs as specified in table 5, the 
results obtained using the alternative ordering of {N1, K1, E, H, N2, K2, E, K1, N1, N2, K2, H} are given in table 
7.  
Using the alternative ordering, consistently fit designs were achieved in each run as shown in table 8. There is 
little variety between the optimal design vectors, the main differences arise in the number of pressure transmitters 
and the number of transmitters required to trip the system. The fittest design arises in run number 5 and has a 
system unavailability of 7.23 x 10
-4 
.  
Run No.  E  K1/N1  H  K2/N2  P  V  θ1  θ2  QSYS  Q′ SYS  
1  x(0)  1  2/3  1  2/2  1  1  23  36  0.00137  0.0061  
 x(11)  0  1/3  2  2/3  1  2  40  24  7.92x10-4  7.92x10-4  
2  x(0)  1  4/4  1  3/3  1  1  70  50  0.0094  0.0094  
 x(11)  0  1/3  2  2/3  1  2  40  24  7.92x10-4  7.92x10-4  
3  x(0)  2  1/1  2  4/4  1  2  40  65  0.0036  0.0067  
 x(11)  0  1/2  2  2/3  1  2  40  24  7.92x10-4  7.92x10-4  
4  x(0)  1  1/3  1  2/3  2  2  89  28  0.004  0.014  
 x(11)  0  1/3  2  2/3  1  2  40  24  7.92x10-4  7.92x10-4  
5  x(0)  2  1/1  1  1/1  2  2  70  50  0.013  0.11  
 x(11)  0  1/2  1  1/2  1  2  34  26  7.23x10-4  7.23x10-4  
 
Table 7: Results using ordering {N1, K1, E, H, N2, K2, E, K1, N1, N2, K2, H}  
Run No.  Cost  MDT  FSYS  QSYS = Q′ SYS  
1  x(11)  842  130  0.847  7.92x10-4  
2  x(11)  842  130  0.847  7.92x10-4  
3  x(11)  822  128.7  0.717  7.92x10-4  
4  x(11)  842  130  0.847  7.92x10-4  
5  x(11)  802  129.3  0.977  7.23x10-4  
 
Table 8: Fitness of optimal design using alternative ordering method 1.  
7.2 Alternative Method 2  
Due to the fact that the look-ahead search incorporates only two variables at a time certain combinations of 
pressure transmitters are never explored. In addition, from the previous results little is achieved by considering 
variable H a second time. For this reason an ordering is established which considers a three-way iteration between 
N1, N2 and K2. Hence, method 2 ordering is {N1, K1, E, H, N2, K2, E, K1, N1&N2&K2} where the 9
th 
iteration of step 
3 in the Branching Search algorithm considers all possible combinations of N1, N2 and K2.  
The same designs are used and the results are given in table 9. Each run results in the same optimal design vector, 
each has fitness values of: cost = 802 units, MDT = 129.3 hours, and spurious trip frequency = 0.977/year. The 
design is highly fit with a system unavailability of 7.23x10
-4 
.  
Run No.  E  K1/N1  H  K2/N2  P  V  θ1  θ2  QSYS  Q′ SYS  
1  x(0)  1  2/3  1  2/2  1  1  23  36  0.00137  0.0061  
 x(11)  0  1/2  2  1/2  1  2  34  26  7.23x10-4  7.23x10-4  
2  x(0)  1  4/4  1  3/3  1  1  70  50  0.0094  0.0094  
 x(11)  0  1/2  2  1/2  1  2  34  26  7.23x10-4  7.23x10-4  
3  x(0)  2  1/1  2  4/4  1  2  40  65  0.0036  0.0067  
 x(11)  0  1/2  2  1/2  1  2  34  26  7.23x10-4  7.23x10-4  
4  x(0)  1  1/3  1  2/3  2  2  89  28  0.004  0.014  
 x(11)  0  1/2  2  1/2  1  2  34  26  7.23x10-4  7.23x10-4  
5  x(0)  2  1/1  1  1/1  2  2  70  50  0.013  0.11  
 x(11)  0  1/2  2  1/2  1  2  34  26  7.23x10-4  7.23x10-4  
 
Table 9: Results using alternative ordering method 2.  
8. Discussion of Results  
Using the Branching Search Approach produces designs that are highly fit. An ordering in which the components 
are considered that accounts for interaction between the design variables is beneficial. The first alternative 
ordering method (section 7.1) considers a different listing on the second occurrence of each design variable as 
opposed to merely repeating the variable ordering. Interaction between the pressure transmitters of each system is 
considered in this way. The second alternative ordering method (section 7.2) considers interaction between a 
number of variables at once as opposed to simply looking ahead to the next variable. This requires greater 
computer effort, due to the number of system unavailability evaluations required, which could be exacerbated the 
more complex the system under consideration, however for this relatively simple system it proves beneficial.  
The HIPS system has characteristics which lend themselves well to the Logical Search optimisation procedure. 
Firstly, the system has only a small number of design variables and the range covered by these is also small. In 
addition, the variables are segregated into two groups, those concerned with subsystem 1 and those with 
subsystem 2. There is obviously interaction between the design variables, however the simplicity of the system 
lends itself well to establishing an efficient order for the variables to be considered in the look-ahead search. 
These features of the HIPS system are not un-typical of safety systems.  
The suitability of any optimisation technique is solely dependent on the specific problem. Techniques that work 
well for some systems may perform poorly for other systems and vice versa. The main concern for a designer is to 
find a technique that has the capability to produce a solution, as shown by this technique. The additional length of 
time that some techniques might take to reach a solution is relatively unimportant compared to the time (and cost) 
taken to make changes after an incorrect design has been implemented. The Branching Search approach appears 
to be both highly efficient and accurate, however, its scope of applicability is limited due to its high demand on 
function evaluations. It is in effect a local approach, which is highly dependent on the choice of initial design 
vector. This dependency on the start point will increase as the complexity of the optimisation problem increases. 
In addition, a high degree of knowledge concerning the system is required to establish both the order in which to 
consider the variables in the look-ahead search and the boundaries used for the tolerable slacks. For these larger 
problems these complexities would need to be tackled given each problem, however, it is envisaged that one 
possible method to help eliminate the high dependence of an initial design choice is to combine the technique 
with a global optimisation technique which would find an effective start point.  
9. Conclusions  
The Branching Search approach has proven to be effective for the HIPS safety system optimisation. Full use of 
the available resources has been sought and achieved with a resulting highly fit design with low unavailability. 
The method shows potential for application to a wider range of problems.  
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